A defamation lawsuit in Israel succeeds when the injured party shows that something was published about him or her that may humiliate or degrade them, and the publisher fails to prove a defense the law recognizes. The most familiar defense, "I spoke the truth" (emet dibarti), requires the publisher to prove that what was said was true and that the publication was in the public interest, and someone who merely repeated a rumor heard from others does not meet it. Two Magistrates' Court decisions reported this week illustrate both sides of this rule.
In the Herzliya Magistrates' Court, Judge David Yitzhak dismissed the claim brought by Yoav Eliasi, known as "HaTzel" (The Shadow), against journalist Raviv Drucker and Channel 13. According to Moshe Cohen's report in Kikar HaShabbat on November 9, 2026, the claim sought NIS 245,000, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants NIS 25,000 in attorneys' fees. The court held that the factual basis of the report had been proven, and that the phrase "one hand washes the other" was an expression of opinion resting on the proven facts. According to Israel Hayom, Eliasi announced that he would appeal to the Tel Aviv District Court.
The next day, Yael Yaffe reported on N12 on a judgment by Judge Ido Kafkafi of the Ashkelon Magistrates' Court, in a dispute of an entirely different kind. A friend of the mother of the family told her, and later the father as well, that she had seen their son's fiancée slap him at a club and that the fiancée appeared drunk. The couple denied it, and the father testified that because of the story he opposed the wedding. In her testimony, the friend said that she had not seen the slap herself and had heard about it from women sitting at her table, and the owner of the club testified that the friend could not have been there. The judge held that the words met the definition of defamation and that the truth defense had not been proven, and ordered the friend to pay the fiancée NIS 10,000. "The defendant had to prove her claim of truth in the publication even if she heard the words from other men or women," he wrote. The fiancé's own claim was dismissed, because the words said about him were not found to degrade him.
The difference between the two outcomes does not stem from the status of the parties, a well-known journalist on one side and a friend of the family on the other. It stems from what each of the defendants was able to prove.
What counts as defamation, and when a private conversation is a publication
Section 1 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, 5725-1965 (Hok Issur Lashon Hara), defines defamation as anything whose publication may humiliate a person in the eyes of others or make him or her a target of hatred, contempt or ridicule, degrade a person because of acts, conduct or traits attributed to them, harm a person in their office, business or profession, or degrade a person because of their race, origin, religion, place of residence, age, sex, sexual orientation or disability. The test is not whether the injured person was offended, but whether the words may humiliate him or her in the eyes of others. Attributing a slap and drunkenness to a bride-to-be, in front of the groom's parents, easily meets that test.
Many people assume that defamation is a matter for newspapers and social networks. The law is far broader. Under section 2, a publication may be oral, written, in a drawing, in a gesture or in any other way, and it is enough that the words were intended for someone other than the injured person and reached that person. Section 7 provides that publishing defamation to one or more persons other than the injured person is a civil wrong. A private conversation with someone's mother, a message in the building's WhatsApp group or a letter to the workers' committee are publications in every sense. The number of listeners affects the amount of compensation, not liability itself.
The law protects more than private individuals. The same section 1 provides that a "person," for purposes of the law, also includes a corporation, so a company or a business can sue as well. Suppose the owner of a metal workshop discovers that a competitor wrote in the WhatsApp group of the area's contractors that he "doesn't pay suppliers and disappears in the middle of a job." That harms him in his business and occupation within the meaning of section 1(3), and the closed group does not take the words outside the definition of a publication. If the competitor is sued, he will have to prove that the workshop owner actually behaved that way, and not merely that he heard so from a disgruntled supplier. And if the workshop owner shows that customers canceled orders because of the message, he can also sue for the proven damage, beyond the compensation that requires no proof.
The truth defense: two conditions, and the burden is on the publisher
Once it is proven that defamation was published, the burden shifts to the publisher. Section 14 of the law grants a defense to someone who proves
"that the matter published was true and the publication was in the public interest" (section 14 of the law)
The two conditions are cumulative. Truth without public interest is not enough, and public interest without truth is not enough. The same section adds that the defense will not be denied merely because the truth of a side detail that causes no real harm was not proven. Someone who wrote that the argument broke out on a Tuesday, when it actually broke out on a Wednesday, will not lose because of that. The core of the harmful claim, however, must be proven.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this requirement before an expanded panel of nine justices in CFH 2121/12 Anonymous v. Dayan-Orbach of September 18, 2014: within the truth defense, the publisher must prove that the matter published was true (English translation of the judgment). In the Herzliya case this is what happened, according to the report: the defendants presented evidence of the facts underlying the report, and the court was persuaded.
"I only repeated what I heard"
This is where the Ashkelon defendant failed, and where many others fail. A person who passes on a rumor tends to see himself or herself as a messenger: they invented nothing, they only told. The law does not accept this distinction. The truth that must be proven is the truth of the content, not the fact that someone else said it. If the slap was not proven, there is no use in proving that women at the next table talked about it.
The law takes account of someone who repeated another's words only at the stage of setting compensation. Section 19 allows the court to consider in the defendant's favor that he or she repeated something already said and named the source relied on, was convinced the words were true, did not intend to harm, and apologized or published a correction in the same place and in the same manner. These are mitigating factors, not defenses: they can reduce the amount, but they do not eliminate liability. The considerations described in the report on the Ashkelon judgment are close to these. According to the report, the judge took into account the limited scope of the publication, the fact that the parents gave the words too much weight, and the fact that the defendant sought to help her friend rather than to harm the bride.
When truth is not enough: public interest and good faith
Family gossip raises a further question. Even someone who can prove that the words are true must show public interest, and in a dispute between two families over a wedding that condition is not self-evident. A simpler example: a resident who spreads true and embarrassing details about a neighbor's old debts, which have nothing to do with the building, in the building's WhatsApp group. The truth alone will not protect him, because it is hard to point to a public interest in such details. The law does not permit exposing everything merely because it is true. That is why in private situations attention often shifts to another defense, the good faith defense in section 15. It applies to someone who published in good faith in one of the circumstances the section lists, among them a publication that the relationship between the publisher and the recipient imposed on the publisher a legal, moral or social duty to make (section 15(2)), and a publication intended to protect a legitimate personal interest of the publisher, of the recipient or of someone in whom the recipient has such an interest (section 15(3)). A friend who warns a mother about a bride she considers dishonest will presumably rely on one of these.
This defense, too, rests on checking. Under section 16(b), the publication is presumed not to have been made in good faith if the matter was untrue and the publisher did not believe it to be true, or if it was untrue and the publisher took no reasonable steps before publishing to ascertain whether it was true. Someone who passes on a story overheard at a nearby table, without checking it with those involved, will find it hard to show that he or she took such steps. In the other direction, under section 16(a), a person who proves that he or she acted in one of the circumstances of section 15 and that the publication did not exceed what was reasonable in those circumstances enjoys a presumption of good faith.
In the media, the good faith defense is assessed by standards of responsible journalism. In the Dayan-Orbach case, the Supreme Court held that a duty to publish matters of significant public importance can fall under section 15(2), but only when the publication is made in good faith and in keeping with strict standards of responsible journalism. In the Herzliya case, according to the report, the court held that even the fact that no response was requested in advance did not defeat the good faith defense. The distinction between fact and opinion did most of the work there: facts must be proven, and an opinion resting on proven facts enjoys broad protection. The same is true of a ruling we reviewed recently, in which an offensive epithet in a public argument on Facebook was recognized as an expression of opinion.
How much a defamation lawsuit is worth
Section 7A allows the court to award compensation without the injured party proving damage. The amount in the law is NIS 50,000, and it is linked to the consumer price index from a base of the September 1998 index. Based on the September 2026 index, the latest published, that comes to about NIS 84,000. When it is proven that the publication was made with intent to harm, the maximum is doubled, to about NIS 168,000. Such compensation can be received only once for the same defamation. A person who proves actual damage, such as lost customers or a lost job, can sue for the damage itself.
The ceiling is a limit, not a starting point. The court sets the compensation according to the severity of the words, the scope of distribution, the standing of the injured party, the conduct of the parties and the considerations in section 19, and for a limited publication the sum is often far from the ceiling. The Ashkelon case ended at NIS 10,000. On the other side of the scale stands exposure to costs: a plaintiff whose claim is dismissed may bear the other side's attorneys' fees, as happened in Herzliya.
Before you sue, and before you defend
A person harmed by a publication should first document it: who said it, to whom, when and in what words. For a written publication, keep screenshots showing the date, the publisher's name and the responses. For an oral publication, as in Ashkelon, the case is built on testimony, so the details should be written down while they are fresh and the people who heard the words should be identified. Before a lawsuit, it is customary to send a warning letter demanding that the publication be removed and an apology made. An apology and correction by the publisher are a mitigating factor under section 19, and sometimes they make the entire proceeding unnecessary. More on this path, from the side of the injured party and from the side of the defendant, on the page defamation claims and defense.
A civil defamation claim is subject to the general limitation period in the Prescription Law, 5718-1958: seven years for a claim not concerning land, from the day the cause of action arose. Even when the deadline is far off, waiting has a price. Witnesses forget, messages are deleted, and a claim filed years after the publication raises the question of why the harm did not trouble the injured party sooner.
A person who received a warning letter or a statement of claim should ask one question before anything else: what can I prove. If he or she holds documents, recordings or witnesses who saw the events themselves, the truth defense may be available, and perhaps the good faith defense as well. If all he or she has is "that's what I was told," the sensible path may be a prompt apology and correction, which limit the harm and the compensation. Someone who has already been sued must prepare to file a statement of defense on time, because missing the deadline may lead to a default judgment. These terms are also explained in the site's glossary of legal terms.
Every publication is examined according to its wording, the context in which it was said and the evidence each side holds, and this week's two decisions show how much the outcome depends on the details. Anyone harmed by words said or written about them, and anyone required to answer such a claim, can contact the firm to have their case reviewed. The firm represents injured parties and defendants in defamation lawsuits throughout Israel.
Questions and answers
What must be proven in a defamation lawsuit in Israel?
The plaintiff must show that something was published about him or her that may humiliate or degrade the plaintiff under section 1 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, and that it reached someone other than the plaintiff. The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must prove a defense the law recognizes, such as truth or good faith. To receive compensation up to the amount in section 7A, the injured party does not have to prove damage.
Is someone who repeats a rumor liable for defamation?
Yes. The truth defense requires proof that the content of the words is true, and it is not enough to show that someone else said them. In a ruling of the Ashkelon Magistrates' Court, reported on November 10, 2026, the court held that the defendant had to prove the truth even if she heard the story from others. The fact that the words had already been said, and naming the source, can only reduce the compensation under section 19 of the law.
What is the truth defense (emet dibarti)?
It is the defense in section 14 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law: the defendant is exempt if he or she proves that what was published was true and that the publication was in the public interest. Both conditions are required together, and the burden of proving them rests on the publisher. Failure to prove a side detail that causes no real harm does not defeat the defense.
How much compensation without proof of damage can be awarded for defamation in Israel?
The amount in section 7A is NIS 50,000, linked to the consumer price index from a base of the September 1998 index, which comes to about NIS 84,000 based on the September 2026 index. When it is proven that the publication was made with intent to harm, the maximum is doubled. This is a ceiling, not a fixed sum, and the court sets the compensation according to the severity of the words, the scope of the publication and the conduct of the parties. A person who proves greater damage can sue for it.
What is the deadline for filing a defamation lawsuit in Israel?
The Prohibition of Defamation Law does not set a special limitation period for a civil claim, so the general period in the Prescription Law applies: seven years from the day the cause of action arose. In practice it is better to act quickly, because testimony fades and messages get deleted.
Can words said orally or in a WhatsApp message be defamation?
Yes. Under section 2 of the law, a publication may be oral, written or made in any other way, and it is enough that the words were intended for someone other than the injured person and reached that person. A conversation with family members or a message in a closed group is a publication in every sense. The scope of distribution affects the amount of compensation, not liability itself.
Sources
- N12, Yael Yaffe: The gossip, the broken engagement, and the damages the mother's friend will pay (Hebrew), 10.11.2026
- Kikar HaShabbat, Moshe Cohen: Yoav Eliasi v. Raviv Drucker: defamation claim dismissed (Hebrew), 9.11.2026
- Israel Hayom, Din Brandstetter: HaTzel claims: "They are carrying out a targeted killing against me" (Hebrew), 11.11.2026
- Prohibition of Defamation Law, 5725-1965, full updated text (Nevo, on the Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law website) (Hebrew), 12.11.2026
- CFH 2121/12 Anonymous v. Dr. Ilana Dayan-Orbach, English translation (Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), 18.9.2014
- Prescription Law, 5718-1958, consolidated version (National Insurance Institute website) (Hebrew), 12.11.2026
This article provides general information and is not a substitute for legal advice on your specific matter. More on Defamation · Contact the firm
First published in Hebrew. Read the Hebrew original